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Good afternoon

I am Rear Admiral Skip Bowman, Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs in J-5 on the Joint Staff.

US-CHINA
DEFENSE TALKS




PEACEKEEPING


Rear Admiral Skip Bowman
Deputy Director
Political-Military Affairs
Joint Staff

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- *UN involvement has virtually exploded in the last few years*
 - *24 operations shown here -- slide needs to be updated almost daily*
 - *Additional stats worth noting:*
 - *During first 44 years, UNSC passed about 1 resolution per month*
 - *Since 1991, it has been averaging 5-7 per month; passed 14 in Jun 93*
 - *1990: 5 UN operations, about 10,000 troops*
 - *1993: 24 operations, 80,000 troops*
 - *PK costs have gone from \$800M to almost \$4B in same period; US pays roughly 1/3 of the cost (30.4%)*
 - *Of these 24 operations, 75,000+ US personnel are involved in 12 of them, either as direct participants or in support.*
 - *We are now dealing with the problems and growing pains of this rapid expansion of UN activity*



SPECTRUM OF UN OPERATIONS




I think we all understand traditional peacekeeping - the peacekeeping that arose during the Cold War, dealt primarily with disputes between states, and evolved a generally accepted set of prerequisites procedures.

I think we also understand the term peace enforcement - operations pursued under the authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The clear examples, of course, are the Gulf War and Korea - although I don't believe the term peace enforcement was in use at that time.

The difficult operations are those that fall in between traditional peacekeeping and large scale peace enforcement. They are neither Chapter VI peacekeeping in the traditional sense, nor all-out Chapter VII enforcement actions. To be quite honest, I think we are all groping in the fog between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

We are now calling operations in this area aggravated peacekeeping - peacekeeping, but without the old rules and familiar landmarks. The challenge for all of us is to learn how to deal with aggravated peacekeeping.

UN HEADQUARTERS



Perhaps no area is more indicative of the problems in dealing with the new and more numerous peacekeeping operations than the UN Secretariat. While acknowledging the responsibilities of member states and acknowledging the speed with which the Security Council has piled on new responsibilities and operations, the fact remains that the UN Secretariat has not adapted quickly enough to its new responsibilities.

It has attempted to undertake new aggravated peacekeeping operations with an organization and concepts designed for traditional peacekeeping.

A prime example of the problem is the organization at the UN headquarters.

- *Department of Peacekeeping and Department of Political Affairs have not always worked well together.*
 - o *improvements have been made, such as the new DPO plan, more is needed.*
 - *Department of Peacekeeping and Department of Humanitarian Affairs have not always coordinated activities.*
 - *Department of Peacekeeping and Department of Humanitarian Affairs have not always worked well together.*
 - o *improvements have been made, such as the new DPO plan, more is needed.*

While some improvements have been made, such as the new DPO organization plan, more is needed.

US PEACEKEEPING POLICY REVIEW

- Jan 92: UNSC Summit
- Jul 92: UNSYG Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace*
- Sep 92: President Bush's Address to UNGA
- Oct 92: NSD-74
- Feb 93: Presidential Directed Review of Peacekeeping

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Let me now turn to the review of US policy on peacekeeping. This review has, in fact been underway for some time and predates the current administration.

Security Council Summit, January 92

- Head of State, Head of Gov't level: first ever
- Post Gulf War / New World Order
- Asked UNSYG for report on how to improve peacekeeping

Agenda for Peace, July 1992

- Preventive diplomacy
- Stand-by forces and Article 43 agreements
- Military Staff Committee
- Peace enforcement units
- Improved financing

Bush Speech to UNGA, Sept 1992, focused on improving peacekeeping

NSD-74 incorporated proposals in Bush speech, and focused on practical ways to improve peacekeeping. However, NSD-74 was never implemented

In February 1993, the Clinton Administration set aside NSD-74 and began with clean slate, bottom-up review of US policies towards UN. The policy review has been extensive and has sparked considerable debate, as you may have been able to follow in news reports.

US initiatives to improve UN peacekeeping include those listed here.

Most of these proposals have already been presented or discussed in some detail in a peacekeeping Contact Group of which your nation is a member.

In meetings with UN USYG for Peacekeeping, Kofi Annan, Contact Group members have exchanged views on how the UN could improve peacekeeping.

PROPOSALS TO STRENGTHEN THE UN

- Evaluate new operations carefully
- Prescribe clear mandates
- Enhance Department of Peace Operations
- Improve logistics support
- Upgrade communications capability
- Improve public affairs capability
- Training program

ADJUSTING US SUPPORT FOR THE UN

- Organizational changes
- Legislative changes
- Field assessments
- Training
- Monetary support
- Command and control

In addition to recommending improvement in the UN, our policy review clearly demonstrated that we ourselves must adapt to be able to more effectively support UN peacekeeping.

To address this we are undertaking a wide range of actions to improve our ability to interact with and to improve our ability to support UN peacekeeping. The areas in which we are making improvement include:

Organization:

- State: new peacekeeping office
- OSD: new peacekeeping office; DSAD
- Joint Staff: new UN Division; expanded from 1 to 7 officers

Legislation: *Changes to ease some of the legal hurdles and inefficiencies impeding support of UN operations*

- UN Participation Act of 1945 limits US participation to 1000 personnel in Chapter VI operations
- Cross servicing agreements with the UN and regional organizations

Training: *Establishing a peacekeeping training program*

- Would include appropriate training for appropriate US forces
- Warfighting remains the primary mission of US forces

Monetary Support: *Paying off our peacekeeping arrearages and working with Congress to achieve more consistent funding support for UN peacekeeping assessments*

Command and Control: *Placing US forces under the operational control of the UN in certain circumstances*

EVOLVING US PERSPECTIVE

Post Cold War remains dangerous place

- Ethnic and nationalist rivalries
- Regional conflicts
- Proliferation
- Refugees
- Humanitarian crises
- Cumulative impact cause for concern

Just as we have been adjusting to better support UN peacekeeping, we have been adjusting our overall views on peacekeeping and its place in US policy.

Events move rapidly these days, and it is only fair to describe our perspective on peacekeeping as evolving rather than rigid. However, we believe there is a general consensus developing on the perspective I will now review with you.

As we see it, the post-Cold War world remains a dangerous and uncertain place.

While the end of the Cold War brought opportunities to end the proxy wars it spawned, it also removed the restraints it imposed on traditional ethnic and nationalist rivalries and hatreds.

Regional instability in the Persian Gulf, the periphery of the former Soviet Union, former Yugoslavia, and the Korean peninsula are symptomatic.

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, refugee and humanitarian crises are also serious concerns.

While these may not equate with the Soviet nuclear and conventional threat, their cumulative impact is cause for concern.

EVOLVING US PERSPECTIVE

- US will not relinquish capacity to act unilaterally
- US must retain military capability
 - Fight and win wars
 - Deter nuclear attacks
- Unilateral military forces insufficient to deal with:
 - Regional, ethnic, civil wars
 - Refugees
 - Mass starvation
 - Anarchy
- Unacceptable burden for one nation

For the foreseeable future, the US must retain its military capability to fight and win wars and to deter nuclear attacks. We cannot relinquish our capacity to act unilaterally with decisive military force in defense of our interests.

However, unilateral military force is insufficient to address the cumulative effect of numerous regional, ethnic, and civil wars accompanied by countless refugees, mass starvation, disease, the breakdown of civil order, and anarchy.

To deal with these conflicts and problems unilaterally would require an overwhelming and prohibitive investment of resources and would result in an unacceptable degradation of our primary national security capabilities.

EVOLVING US PERSPECTIVE

- UN can provide leverage
- Effective multilateral mechanism essential
 - To deal with conflicts impinging on national security
 - To avoid sapping US military capabilities
- Unilateral or coalition action
 - When UN involvement not possible
 - Unacceptable infringement
 - Large scale Chapter VII operations

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UN peacekeeping, properly supported and competently performed offers one means not only to deal with these problems but also to share the costs and the burdens.

If we are to address these problems which impinge on our national security concerns, we see effective multilateral efforts, such as UN peacekeeping, as essential to avoid sapping our capability to perform primary military security missions successfully and decisively.

We recognize that UN action is not always practical. When agreement on UN involvement is not possible or when it would come only with unacceptable infringement on our ability to achieve vital national goals, we must remain capable of acting unilaterally. And when large-scale involvement of US troops is called for, national command requirements will take precedence.

Nonetheless, it would be unwise to go it alone in instances where there is an effective alternative that is less costly in terms of money, personnel, and political cost. The UN can frequently provide this alternative.

EVOLVING US PERSPECTIVE

- Will support multilateral efforts when practical and in our interest to do so
- UN peacekeeping one instrument
- Questions to answer
 - Real threat to international peace and security?
 - Clear objectives and can its scope be defined?
 - Cease-fire in place?
 - Parties to the conflict agreed to a UN presence?
 - Financial and human resources available?
 - Can an end point be identified?

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One of the underlying theses of our post World War II strategy was that our strength is made even greater when cemented by strong alliances and joint endeavors with other nations in pursuit of common objectives.

The end of the Cold War has opened renewed prospects for multilateral cooperation in the UN that had long been limited by the Western-Soviet rivalry.

We see UN peacekeeping as a viable multilateral instrument to help address the many problems facing the world today. We will support multilateral efforts through the UN on a case-by case basis when it is practical and in our interest to do so.

But before we decide whether or not to support a UN peacekeeping or peace enforcement resolution, we are insisting that certain fundamental questions be asked before, not after, new obligations are undertaken. These questions include:

- Is there a real threat to international peace and security?
 - Does the proposed peacekeeping mission have clear objectives and can its scope be clearly defined?
 - Is a cease-fire in place and have the parties to the conflict agreed to a UN presence?
 - Are the financial and human resources that will be needed to accomplish the mission available to be used for that purpose?
 - Can an end point to UN participation be identified?
- It is important that we ask these hard questions so that the UN can succeed in missions we give it and to ensure it remains a viable multilateral instrument.

CONCLUSION

- Will not retreat into Cold War foxhole
- Will not send America's men and women into harm's way without:
 - Clear, achievable mission
 - Competent Commanders
 - Sensible Rules of Engagement
 - Means Required to Do the Job
- Will support well-conceived, well-managed, cost-effective, properly supported, and justifiable UN peacekeeping operations which have clear, achievable mandates, sensible rules of engagement, and competent commanders.

In summarizing I would like to stress that the United States will not retreat into a post Cold War foxhole.

Nor, however, will we send American men and women in harm's way without a clear mission, competent commanders, sensible rules of engagement, and the means required to get the job done.

We will support well-conceived, well-managed, cost-effective, properly supported, and justifiable UN peacekeeping operations which have clear, achievable mandates, sensible rules of engagement, and competent commanders.

Thank you for your attention. I welcome any questions you may have or items you wish to discuss.